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I. INTRODUCTION
Structural results for POMDPs are important since solving POMDPs numerically are typically intractable. Solving
a classical POMDP is known to be PSPACE-complete [40]. Moreover, in controlled sensing problems [16], [26],
[10], it is often necessary to use POMDPs that are nonlinear in the belief state in order to model the uncertainty
in the state estimate. (For example, the variance of the state estimate is a quadratic function of the belief.) In such
cases, there is no finite dimensional characterization of the optimal POMDP policy even for a finite horizon.
The seminal papers [35], [43], [44] give sufficient conditions on the costs, transition provabilities and observation
probabilities so that the value function of a POMDP is monotone with respect to the monotone likelihood ratio
(MLR) order (and more generally the multivariate TP2 order). These papers then use this monotone result to show
that the optimal policy can be lower bounded by a myopic policy. Our recent works [20], [28] relax the conditions
on the transition matrix to construct myopic lower and upper bounds.
II. THE PARTIALLY OBSERVED MARKOV DECISION PROCESS
For notational convenience, we consider a discrete time, infinite horizon discounted cost POMDP. A discrete
time Markov chain evolves on the state space X = {1, 2, . . . , X}. Denote the action space as U = {1, 2, . . . , U}
and observation space as Y . For discrete-valued observations Y = {1, 2, . . . , Y } and for continuous observations
Y ⊂ IR.
Let Π(X) =
{
π : π(i) ∈ [0, 1],
∑X
i=1 π(i) = 1
}
denote the belief space of X-dimensional probability vectors.
For stationary policy µ : Π(X) → U , initial belief π0 ∈ Π(X), discount factor ρ ∈ [0, 1), define the discounted
cost:
Jµ(π0) = Eµ
{
∞∑
k=0
ρkc′µ(pik)πk
}
. (1)
Here cu = [c(1, u), . . . , c(X,u)]′, u ∈ U is the cost vector for each action, and the belief state evolves as πk =
T (πk−1, yk, uk) where
T (π, y, u) =
By(u)P
′(u)π
σ (π, y, u)
, σ (π, y, u) = 1′XBy(u)P
′(u)π, By(u) = diag{B1,y(u), · · · , BX,y(u)}. (2)
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2Here 1X represents a X-dimensional vector of ones, P (u) = [Pij(u)]X×X Pij(u) = P(xk+1 = j|xk = i, uk = a)
denote the transition probabilities, Bxy(u) = P(yk+1 = y|xk+1 = x, uk = u) when Y is finite, or Bxy(u) is the
conditional probability density function when Y ⊂ IR.
The aim is to compute the optimal stationary policy µ∗ : Π(X) → U such that Jµ∗(π0) ≤ Jµ(π0) for all
π0 ∈ Π(X). Obtaining the optimal policy µ∗ is equivalent to solving Bellman’s dynamic programming equation:
µ∗(π) = argmin
u∈U
Q(π, u), Jµ∗(π0) = V (π0), where
V (π) = min
u∈U
Q(π, u), Q(π, u) = c′uπ + ρ
∑
y∈Y
V (T (π, y, u))σ (π, y, u) . (3)
Since Π(X) is continuum, Bellman’s equation (3) does not translate into practical solution methodologies as the
value function V (π) needs to be evaluated at each π ∈ Π(X).
A. POMDPs in Controlled Sensing
In controlled sensing, to incorporate uncertainty of the state estimate, we generalize the above POMDP to consider
costs that are nonlinear in the belief. Consider the following instantaneous cost at each time k:
c(xk, uk) + d(xk, πk, uk), uk ∈ U = {1, 2, . . . , U}.
(i) Sensor Usage Cost: c(xk, uk) denotes the instantaneous cost of using sensor uk at time k when the Markov
chain is in state xk.
(ii) Sensor Performance Loss: d(xk, πk, uk) models the performance loss when using sensor uk. This loss is modeled
as an explicit function of the belief state πk to capture the uncertainty in the state estimate.
Typically there is trade off between the sensor usage cost and performance loss. Accurate sensors have high
usage cost but small performance loss.
Then in terms of the belief state, the instantaneous cost can be expressed as
C(πk, uk) = E{c(xk, uk) + d(xk, πk, uk)|Ik}
= c′ukπk +D(πk, uk),
where cu = (c(u, 1), . . . , c(u,X))′,
D(πk, uk)
defn
= E{d(xk, πk, uk)|Ik} =
X∑
i=1
d(i, πk, uk)πk(i).
(4)
Define the controlled sensing objective
Jµ(π0) = Eµ
{
∞∑
k=0
ρkD(πk, uk)
}
. (5)
In controlled sensing, the aim is to compute the optimal stationary policy µ∗ : Π(X) → U such that Jµ∗(π0) ≤
Jµ(π0) for all π0 ∈ Π(X). Obtaining the optimal controlled sensing policy µ∗ is equivalent to solving Bellman’s
dynamic programming equation: µ∗(π) = argmin
u∈U
Q(π, u), Jµ∗(π0) = V (π0), where
V (π) = min
u∈U
Q(π, u), Q(π, u) = C(π, u) + ρ
∑
y∈Y
V (T (π, y, u)) σ (π, y, u) . (6)
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3B. Examples of Nonlinear Cost POMDP
The non-standard feature of the objective (5) is the nonlinear performance loss terms D(π, u). These costs1 should
be chosen so that they are zero at the vertices ei of the belief space Π(X) (reflecting perfect state estimation) and
largest at the centroid of the belief space (most uncertain estimate). We now discuss examples of d(x, π, u) and its
conditional expectation D(π, u).
(i). Piecewise Linear Cost: Here we choose the performance loss as
d(x, π, u) =


0 if ‖x− π‖∞ ≤ ǫ
ǫ if ǫ ≤ ‖x− π‖∞ ≤ 1− ǫ
1 if ‖x− π‖∞ ≥ 1− ǫ
, ǫ ∈ [0, 0.5]. (7)
Then D(π, u) is piecewise linear and concave. This cost is useful for subjective decision making. e.g., the distance
of a target to a radar is quantized into three regions: close, medium and far.
(ii). Mean Square, l1 and l∞ Performance Loss: Suppose in (5) we choose
d(x, π, u) = α(u)(x − π)′M(x− π) + β(u), x ∈ {e1, . . . , eX}, π ∈ Π. (8)
Here M is a user defined positive semi-definite symmetric matrix, α(u) and β(u), u ∈ U are user defined positive
scalar weights that allow different sensors (sensing modes) to be weighed differently. So (8) is the squared error
of the Bayesian estimator (weighted by M , scaled by α(u) and translated by β(u)). In terms of the belief state,
the mean square performance loss (8) is
D(πk, uk) = E{d(xk, πk, uk)|Ik} = α(uk)
( X∑
i=1
Miiπk(i)− π
′
kMπk
)
+ β(uk) (9)
because E{(xk − πk)′M(xk − πk)|Ik} =
∑X
i=1(ei − π)
′M(ei − π)π(i). The cost (9) is quadratic and concave in
the belief.
Alternatively, if d(x, π, u) = ‖x − π‖1 then D(π, u) = 2(1 − π′π) is also quadratic in the belief. Also, choosing
d(x, π, u) = ‖x− π‖∞ yields D(π, u) = (1− π′π).
(iii). Entropy based Performance Loss: Here we choose
D(π, u) = −α(u)
S∑
i=1
π(i) log2 π(i) + β(u), π ∈ Π. (10)
The intuition is that an inaccurate sensor with cheap usage cost yields a Bayesian estimate π with a higher entropy
compared to an accurate sensor.
III. STRUCTURAL RESULT 1 - CONVEXITY OF VALUE FUNCTION AND STOPPING SET
Our first result is that the value function V (π) in (6) is concave in π ∈ Π(X).
1A linear function c′
u
pi cannot attain its maximum at the centroid of a simplex since a linear function achieves it maximum at a boundary
point.
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4Theorem III.1. Consider a POMDP with possibly continuous-valued observations. Assume that for each action
u, the instantaneous cost C(π, u) are concave and continuous with respect to π ∈ Π(X). Then the value function
V (π) is concave in π.
The proof is given in [20, Chapter 8].
A. Convexity of Stopping Set for Stopping Time POMDPs with nonlinear cost
With the above concavity result we have the following important result for contolled sensing stopping time
POMDPs. A stopping time POMDP has action space U = {1 (stop), 2 (continue)}.
The stop action u = 1 incurs a terminal cost of c(x, u = 1) and the problem terminates.
For continue action u = 2, the state x ∈ X = {1, 2, . . . , X} evolves with transition matrix P and is observed
via observations y with observation probabilities Bxy = P(yk = y|xk = x). An instantaneous cost c(x, u = 2) is
incurred. Thus for u = 2, the belief state evolves according to the HMM filter πk = T (πk−1, yk). Since action 1 is
a stop action and has no dynamics, to simplify notation, we write T (π, y, 2) as T (π, y) and σ(π, y, 2) as σ(π, y)
in this subsection.
For the stopping time POMDP, µ∗ is the solution of Bellman’s equation which is of the form
µ∗(π) = argmin
u∈U
Q(π, u), V (π) = min
u∈U
Q(π, u), (11)
Q(π, 1) = c′1π, Q(π, 2) = C(π, 2) + ρ
∑
y∈Y
V (T (π, y))σ (π, y) .
where T (π, y) and σ(π, y) are the HMM filter and normalization (2).
We now present the first structural result for stopping time POMDPs: the stopping region for the optimal policy
is convex. Define the stopping set R1 as the set of belief states for which stopping (u = 1) is the optimal action.
Define R2 as the set of belief states for which continuing (u = 2) is the optimal action. That is
R1 = {π : µ
∗(π) = 1 (stop) }, R2 = {π : µ∗(π) = 2} = Π(X)−R1. (12)
The theorem below shows that the stopping set R1 is convex (and therefore a connected set). Recall that the
value function V (π) is concave on Π(X).
Theorem III.2. Consider the stopping-time POMDP with value function given by (11). Suppose that the possibly
nonlinear cost C(π, 2) is concave in π. Then the stopping set R1 is a convex subset of the belief space Π(X).
Proof: Pick any two belief states π1, π2 ∈ R1. To demonstrate convexity of R1, we need to show for any
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5λ ∈ [0, 1], λπ1 + (1− λ)π2 ∈ R1. Since V (π) is concave,
V (λπ1 + (1 − λ)π2) ≥ λV (π1) + (1− λ)V (π2)
= λQ(π1, 1) + (1− λ)Q(π2, 1) (since π1, π2 ∈ R1)
= Q(λπ1 + (1 − λ)π2, 1) (since Q1(π, 1) is linear in π)
≥ V (λπ1 + (1 − λ)π2) (since V (π) is the optimal value function)
Thus all the inequalities above are equalities, and λπ1 + (1− λ)π2 ∈ R1.
The above theorem is a small extension of [34] which deals with case when the costs C(π, 2) are linear in π.
The proof is exactly the same as in [34] – all that is required is that C(π, 2) is concave
B. Example. Quickest Change Detection with Nonlinear Delay Cost
Quickest detection is a useful example of a stopping time POMDP that has applications in numerous areas
[42], [2]. The classical Bayesian quickest detection problem is as follows: An underlying discrete-time state
process x jump changes at a geometrically distributed random time τ0. Consider a sequence of random mea-
surements {yk, k ≥ 1}, such that conditioned on the event {τ0 = t}, yk, {k ≤ t} are i.i.d. random variables
with distribution B1y and {yk, k > t} are i.i.d. random variables with distribution B2y . The quickest detection
problem involves detecting the change time τ0 with minimal cost. That is, at each time k = 1, 2, . . ., a decision
uk ∈ {continue, stop and announce change} needs to be made to optimize a tradeoff between false alarm frequency
and linear delay penalty.2
A geometrically distributed change time τ0 is realized by a two state (X = 2) Markov chain with absorbing
transition matrix P and prior π0 as follows:
P =

 1 0
1− P22 P22

 , π0 =

0
1

 , τ0 = inf{k : xk = 1}. (13)
The system starts in state 2 and then jumps to the absorbing state 1 at time τ0. Clearly τ0 is geometrically distributed
with mean 1/(1− P22).
The cost criterion in classical quickest detection is the Kolmogorov–Shiryayev criterion for detection of disorder
[46]
Jµ(π) = dEµ{(τ − τ
0)+}+ Pµ(τ < τ
0), π0 = π. (14)
where µ denotes the decision policy. The first term is the delay penalty in making a decision at time τ > τ0 and
d is a positive real number. The second term is the false alarm penalty incurred in announcing a change at time
τ < τ0.
2There are two general formulations for quickest time detection. In the first formulation, the change point τ0 is an unknown deterministic
time, and the goal is to determine a stopping rule such that a worst case delay penalty is minimized subject to a constraint on the false alarm
frequency (see, e.g., [37], [41], [51], [42]). The second formulation, which is the formulation considered in this book (this chapter and also
Chapter ??), is the Bayesian approach where the change time τ0 is specified by a prior distribution.
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6Stopping time POMDP: The quickest detection problem with penalty (14) is a stopping time POMDP with
U = {1 (announce change and stop), 2 (continue)}, X = {1, 2}, transition matrix in (13), arbitrary observation
probabilities Bxy , cost vectors c1 = [0, 1]′, c2 = [d, 0]′ and discount factor ρ = 1.
In light of Theorem III.2, we can generalize this to delay costs C(π, 2) that are convex and nonlinear in the belief.
For example such a cost could be motivated by the square error or entropy of the belief reflecting an inaccurate
state estimate. We have the following structural result.
Corollary III.3. The optimal policy µ∗ for classical quickest detection has a threshold structure: There exists a
threshold point π∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that
uk = µ
∗(πk) =


2 (continue) if πk(2) ∈ [π∗, 1]
1 (stop and announce change) if πk(2) ∈ [0, π∗).
(15)
Proof: Since X = 2, Π(X) is the interval [0, 1], and π(2) ∈ [0, 1] is the belief state. Theorem III.2 implies
that the stopping set R1 is convex. In one dimension this implies that R1 is an interval of the form [a∗, π∗) for
0 ≤ a < π∗ ≤ 1. Since state 1 is absorbing, Bellman’s equation (11) with ρ = 1 applied at π = e1 implies
µ∗(e1) = argmin
u
{c(1, u = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
, d(1− π(2)) + V (e1)} = 1.
So e1 or equivalently π(2) = 0 belongs to R1. Therefore, R1 is an interval of the form [0, π∗). Hence the optimal
policy is of the form (15).
Theorem III.2 says that for quickest detection of a multi-state Markov chain, the stopping set R1 is convex for
any concave non-linear delay cost. This is different to the result in [17] which considered a nonlinear stopping
cost (false alarm cost) - in [17] the stopping set was not necessarily convex. For additional results on controlled
sampling with quickest detection see [19].
Social Learning
Social learning, or learning from the actions of others, is an integral part of human behavior and has been studied
widely in behavioral economics, sociology, electrical engineering and computer science to model the interaction
of decision makers [3], [1], [6], [9], [45], [50], [18], [29], [30]. POMDPs with social learning result in interesting
behaviour.
Social learning models present unique challenges from a statistical signal processing point of view. First, agents
interact with and influence each other. For example, ratings posted on online reputation systems strongly influence
the behavior of individuals. This is usually not the case with physical sensors. Second, agents (humans) lack the
capability to quickly absorb information and translate it into decisions. According to the paradigm of rational
inattention theory, pioneered by economics Nobel prize winner Sims [47], attention is a time-limited resource
that can be modelled in terms of an information-theoretic channel capacity. Therefore, while apparently mistaken
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7decisions are ubiquitous, this does not imply that decision makers are irrational.3 More recently for results in
quickest detection POMDPs with social learning and risk averse agents please see [18], [22].
Remark: Of course, one of the best known examples of a stopping time problem is optimal search for a Markov
target [8], [36], [48], [15]. Another interesting example is a multiple stopping problem [38], [21]; this has applications
in interactive advertising in social multimedia like YouTube. The problem has distinct parallels to scheduling in
communication systems [39].
IV. THE VALUE FUNCTION IS POSITIVELY HOMOGENOUS
Define the positive X-orthant as IRX+ . On this positive orthant, define the relaxed belief state α. We can define
the following Bellman’s equation where W below denotes the value function with α ∈ IRX+ .
W (α) = min
u∈U
Q(α, u), Q(α, u) = c′uα+ ρ
∑
y∈Y
W (T (α, y, u))σ (α, y, u) . (16)
Clearly when α is restricted to the belief space (unit simplex) Π(X), then W (α) = V (α). This can be established
by mathematical induction (valued iteration) and the proof is omitted. We now have the following result.
Theorem IV.1. The relaxed value function W (·) of a linear cost POMDP is positively homogenous. That is, for
any constant κ > 0, W (κα) = κW (α). Therefore, (16) can be expressed as
W (α) = min
u∈U
Q(α, u), Q(α, u) = c′uα+ ρ
∑
y∈Y
W (By(u)P
′(u)α) (17)
The proof is straightforward since the cost c′uα and σ(α, y, u) are linear in α and T (κα, y, µ) = T (α, y, µ).
It is this positive homogeneity property of the value function and especially the representation (17) which allows
for the finite horizon case to immediately show that the value function is piecewise linear and concave.
V. MONOTONE VALUE FUNCTION
Definition V.1 (Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) order ≥r). Let π1, π2 ∈ Π(X) denote two beliefs. Then π1
dominates π2 with respect to the MLR order, denoted as π1 ≥r π2, if π1(i)π2(j) ≤ π2(i)π1(j) i < j, i, j ∈
{1, . . . , X}. A function φ : Π(X)→ IR is said to be MLR increasing if π1 ≥r π2 implies φ(π1) ≥ φ(π2).
(A1) C(π, u) is first order stochastic decreasing in π for each u ∈ U .
(A2) P (u), u ∈ U is totally positive of order 2 (TP2): all second-order minors are nonnegative.
(A3) B(u), u ∈ U is totally positive of order 2 (TP2).
Theorem V.2. Under A1, A2 and A3, the value function V (π) in (6) is MLR decreasing.
The proof of the theorem is in [20], [25].
3Limits on attention impact choice. For example, purchasers limit their attention to a relatively small number of websites when buying over
the internet; shoppers buy expensive products due to their failure to notice if sales tax is includes in the price [5].
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8Note that for 2 states (X = 2), one can always permute the observation labels so that A3 holds. Moreover, A2
then becomes the same as the first row being first order stochastic dominated by the second row. Therefore for
X = 2, the conditons for a monotone value function for a POMDP are identical to that for a fully observed MDP.
Based on extensive numerical experiments, we conjecture that assumption A3 is not required for Theorem V.2.
Conjecture V.1. Under A1 and A2, the value function V (π) in (6) is MLR decreasing.
This conjecture implies that monotone value functions for POMDPs require very similar conditions to monotone
value functions for fully observed MDPs. Of course, the TP2 condition A2 for the transition matrix is stronger than
the first order dominance conditions on the transition matrix used for fully observed MDPs.
Finally we mention that one can also show that the value function involving controlled sensing with a Kalman
filter is monotone [24]. In this case, the covariance matrices of the Kalman filters are partially ordered with respect
to positive definiteness. Results for monotone HMM filters are given in [31]. These monotone results can also be
used for POMDP bandits as discussed in [32]. One can also consider controlled sampling of an evolving duplication
deletion graph; the dynamics of the belief are given by the HMM filter as described in [23].
VI. BLACKWELL DOMINANCE AND OPTIMALITY OF MYOPIC POLICIES
A. Myopic Policy Bound to Optimal Decision Policy
Motivated by active sensing applications, consider the following POMDPs where based on the current belief state
πk−1, agent k chooses sensing mode
uk ∈ {1 (low resolution sensor) , 2 (high resolution sensor)}.
The assumption that mode u = 2 yields more accurate observations than mode u = 1 is modeled as follows: We
say mode 2 Blackwell dominates mode 1, denoted as
B(2) B B(1) if B(1) = B(2)R. (18)
Here R is a Y (2)× Y (1) stochastic matrix. R can be viewed as a confusion matrix that maps Y(2) probabilistically
to Y(1). (In a communications context, one can view R as a noisy discrete memoryless channel with input y(2) and
output y(1)). Intuitively (18) means that B(2) is more accurate than B(1).
The goal is to compute the optimal policy µ∗(π) ∈ {1, 2} to minimize the expected cumulative cost incurred by
all the agents
Jµ(π) = Eµ{
∞∑
k=0
ρkC(πk, uk)}. (19)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor. Even though solving the above POMDP is computationally intractable in
general, using Blackwell dominance, we show below that a myopic policy forms a lower bound for the optimal
policy.
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9The value function V (π) and optimal policy µ∗(π) satisfy Bellman’s equation
V (π) = min
u∈U
Q(π, u), µ∗(π) = argmin
u∈U
Q(π, u), Jµ∗(π) = V (π)
Q(π, u) = C(π, u) + ρ
∑
y(u)∈Y(u)
V (T (π, y, u))σ(π, y, u),
T (π, y, u) =
By(u)(u)P
′π
σ(π, y, u)
, σ(π, y, u) = 1′XBy(u)(u)P
′π.
(20)
We now present the structural result. Let Πs ⊂ Π denote the set of belief states for which C(π, 2) < C(π, 1).
Define the myopic policy
µ(π) =


2 π ∈ Πs
1 otherwise
Theorem VI.1. Assume that C(π, u) is concave with respect to π ∈ Π(X) for each action u. Suppose B(2) B
B(1), i.e., B(1) = B(2)R holds where R is a stochastic matrix. Then the myopic policy µ(π) is a lower bound
to the optimal policy µ∗(π), i.e., µ∗(π) ≥ µ(π) for all π ∈ Π. In particular, for π ∈ Πs, µ∗(π) = µ(π), i.e., it is
optimal to choose action 2 when the belief is in Πs.
Remark: If B(1) B B(2), then the myopic policy constitutes an upper bound to the optimal policy.
Theorem VI.1 is proved below. The proof exploits the fact that the value function is concave and uses Jensen’s
inequality. The usefulness of Theorem VI.1 stems from the fact that µ(π) is trivial to compute. It forms a provable
lower bound to the computationally intractable optimal policy µ∗(π). Since µ is sub-optimal, it incurs a higher
cumulative cost. This cumulative cost can be evaluated via simulation and is an upper bound to the achievable
optimal cost.
Theorem VI.1 is non-trivial. The instantaneous costs satisfying C(π, 2) < C(π, 1), does not trivially imply that
the myopic policy µ(π) coincides with the optimal policy µ∗(π), since the optimal policy applies to a cumulative
cost function involving an infinite horizon trajectory of the dynamical system.
B. Example 1. Optimal Filter vs Predictor Scheduling
Suppose u = 2 is an active sensor (filter) which obtains measurements of the underlying Markov chain and uses
the optimal HMM filter on these measurements to compute the belief and therefore the state estimate. So the usage
cost of sensor 2 is high (since obtaining observations is expensive and can also result in increased threat of being
discovered), but its performance cost is low (performance quality is high).
Suppose sensor u = 1 is a predictor which needs no measurement. So its usage cost is low (no measurement is
required). However its performance cost is high since it is more inaccurate compared to sensor 2.
Since the predictor has non-informative observation probabilities, its observation probability matrix is B(1) =
1
Y 1X×Y . So clearly B(1) = B(2)B(1) meaning that the filter (sensor 2) Blackwell dominates the predictor (sensor
1) Theorem VI.1 then says that if the current belief is πk , then if C(πk, 2) < C(πk, 1), it is always optimal to
deploy the filter (sensor 2).
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C. Example 2. Ultrametric Matrices and Blackwell Dominance
An X ×X square matrix B is a symmetric stochastic ultrametric matrix if
1) B is symmetric and stochastic.
2) Bij ≥ min{Bik, Bkj} for all i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X}.
3) Bii > max{Bik}, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X} − {i} (diagonally dominant).
It is shown in [12] that if B is a symmetric stochastic ultrametric matrix, then the U -th root, namely B1/U , is also
a stochastic matrix4 for any positive integer U . Then with B denoting Blackwell dominance (18), clearly
B1/U B B
2/(U) B · · · B B
(U−1)/U B B.
Consider a social network where the reputations of agents are denoted as u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , U}. An agent with reputation
u has observation probability matrix B(U−u+1)/U . So an agent with reputation 1 (lowest reputation) is U degrees
of separation from the source signal while an agent with reputation U (highest reputation) is 1 degree of separation
from the source signal. The underlying source (state) could be a news event, sentiment or corporate policy that
evolves with time. A marketing agency can sample these agents - it can sample high reputation agents that have
accurate observations but this costs more than sampling low reputation agents that have less accurate observations.
Then Theorem VI.1 gives a suboptimal policy that provably lower bounds the optimal sampling policy.
D. Proof of Theorem VI.1
Recall from Theorem III.1 that C(π, u) concave implies that V (π) is concave on Π(X). We then use the Blackwell
dominance condition (18). In particular,
T (π, y(1), 1) =
∑
y(2)∈Y(2)
T (π, y(2), 2)
σ(π, y(2), 2)
σ(π, y(1), 1)
P (y(1)|y(2))
σ(π, y(1), 1) =
∑
y(2)∈Y(2)
σ(π, y(2), 2)P (y(1)|y(2)).
Therefore σ(pi,y
(2),2)
σ(pi,y(1),1)
P (y(1)|y(2)) is a probability measure w.r.t. y(2) (since the denominator is the sum of the
numerator over all y(2)). Since V (·) is concave, using Jensen’s inequality it follows that
V (T (π, y(1), 1)) = V

 ∑
y(2)∈Y(2)
T (π, y(2), 2)
σ(π, y(2), 2)
σ(π, y(1), 1)
P (y(1)|y(2))


≥
∑
y(2)∈Y(2)
V (T (π, y(2), 2))
σ(π, y(2), 2)
σ(π, y(1), 1)
P (y(1)|y(2))
=⇒
∑
y(1)
V (T (π, y(1), 1))σ(π, y(1), 1) ≥
∑
y(2)
V (T (π, y(2), 2)σ(π, y(2), 2). (21)
4Although we do not pursue it here, conditions that ensure that the U -th root of a transition matrix is a valid stochastic matrix is important
in interpolating Markov chains. For example, transition matrices for credit ratings on a yearly time scale can be obtained from rating agencies
such as Standard & Poor’s. Determining the transition matrix for periods of six months involves the square root of the yearly transition matrix
[12].
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Therefore for π ∈ Πs,
C(π, 2) + ρ
∑
y(2)
V (T (π, y(2), 2)σ(π, y(2), 2) ≤ C(π, 1) + ρ
∑
y(1)
V (T (π, y(1)), 1)σ(π, y(1), 1).
So for π ∈ Πs, the optimal policy µ∗(π) = argminu∈U Q(π, u) = 2. So µ(π) = µ∗(π) = 2 for π ∈ Πs and
µ¯(π) = 1 otherwise, implying that µ¯(π) is a lower bound for µ∗(π).
The above result is quite general and can be extended to controlled sensing of jump Markov linear systems [7],
[33], [10].
VII. INVERSE POMDPS AND REVEALED PREFERENCES
How to develop data-centric non-parametric methods (algorithms and associated mathematical analysis) to
identify utility functions of agents? Classical statistical decision theory arising in electrical engineering (and statistics)
is model based: given a model5, we wish to detect specific events in a dataset. The goal is the reverse: given a
dataset, we wish to determine if the actions of agents are consistent with utility maximization behavior, or more
generally, consistent with play from a Nash equilibrium; and we then wish to estimate the associated utility function.
Such problems will be studied using revealed preference methods arising in micro-economics. Classical revealed
preferences deals with analyzing choices made by individuals. The celebrated “Afriat’s theorem” [49], [4] provides
a necessary and sufficient condition for a finite dataset to have originated from a utility maximizer. Specifically,
revealed preferences [27], [14], [13], rational inattention, homophily [11], and social learning can be used to study
multi-agent behavior in social networks; particularly YouTube.
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